7.5. Tutorial 5: Remote Attestation

This tutorial explains how to build and run a simple proof of work application leveraging attestation instead of one way functions.

This application consists of three parts: an EApp running in the keystone enclave, a host application that initializes and launches the eapp, and a remote verifier verifying that the client did run the EApp (i.e. the proof of work).

Before jumping into the tutorial, please complete Quick Start.

7.5.1. Prerequisite

Set PATH to include RISC-V tools and KEYSTONE_SDK_DIR to point the absolute path of the installed SDK.

Let’s take a look at the example provided in Keystone SDK.

ls sdk/examples/attestation

You can find two directories and CMakeLists.txt.

7.5.2. Enclave Application: attestor.c

Open attestor.c file in sdk/exmamples/attestation/eapp/. This is the source code of the enclave application.

#include "app/eapp_utils.h"
#include "app/syscall.h"
#include "edge/edge_common.h"


main() {
  struct edge_data retdata;
  ocall(OCALL_GET_STRING, NULL, 0, &retdata, sizeof(struct edge_data));

  for (unsigned long i = 1; i <= 10000; i++) {
    if (i % 5000 == 0) {
      ocall(OCALL_PRINT_VALUE, &i, sizeof(unsigned long), 0, 0);

  char nonce[2048];
  if (retdata.size > 2048) retdata.size = 2048;
  copy_from_shared(nonce, retdata.offset, retdata.size);

  char buffer[2048];
  attest_enclave((void*)buffer, nonce, retdata.size);

  ocall(OCALL_COPY_REPORT, buffer, 2048, 0, 0);


This is the standard C program that we will run isolated in an enclave. This program gets a random nonce from the verifier via the host, iterate 100000 times, then send the nonce as part of the attestation report back

7.5.3. Host Application: host.cpp

Open host.h in sdk/examples/attestation/host/. This is the C++ class definition of the host application. To simplify this example, we are implementing the remote verifier and the host in two different classes (the Verifier class and the Host class) but including them in the same binary (attestor_runner.cpp in sdk/examples/attestation/host/). We use the host.cpp file to encapsulate all the code needed by the host, and the verifier.cpp to encapsulate all the code needed by the verifier.

// The Host class mimicks a host interacting with the local enclave
// and the remote verifier.
class Host {
    const Keystone::Params& params, const std::string& eapp_file,
    const std::string& rt_file)
    : params_(params), eapp_file_(eapp_file), rt_file_(rt_file) {}
    // Given a random nonce from the remote verifier, this method leaves
    // it for the enclave to fetch, and returns the attestation report
    // from the enclave to the verifier.
    Report run(const std::string& nonce);

  // ... See host.h for the full source code.

Let’s first take a look at how the Host::run method is implemented:

Host::run(const std::string& nonce) {
  Keystone::Enclave enclave;
  enclave.init(eapp_file_.c_str(), rt_file_.c_str(), params_);

  RunData run_data{
      SharedBuffer{enclave.getSharedBuffer(), enclave.getSharedBufferSize()},
      nonce, nullptr};

  enclave.registerOcallDispatch([&run_data](void* buffer) {
    assert(buffer == (void*)run_data.shared_buffer.ptr());

  uintptr_t encl_ret;

  return *run_data.report;

The main job of the host is to relay messages from the remote verifier to the EApp, and vice-versa.

7.6. Remote Verifier: verifier.cpp

The remote verifier is the most interesting part of this tutorial. As mentioned above, although the remote verifier is actually implemented in the same binary file as the host, in reality the remote verifier usually runs on a different machine and communicates with the host remotely. The goal of the remote verifier is to ensure that the host runs the EApp til the end, and this is achieved by sending a random nonce to the EApp via the host, and verifying the attestation report sent from the EApp. The nonce is to prevent replay attacks.

In order for the verification to be sound, the verifier needs to do the following things:

1. Perform analysis on the security monitor to ensure the security monitor does the right thing with regards to security. 2. Perform analysis on the EApp binary to ensure the EApp indeed iterates 10000 times and only sends the attestation report after the loop. 3. Verify the security monitor used by the host machine is the one analyzed in 1. 4. Verify the EApp ran by the host is the one analyzed in 2. 5. Verify the nonce sent from the EApp is the one generated by the verifier.

While 1 and 2 are typically done beforehand (or delegated to a trusted party), 3-5 are done at runtime by checking signature and payload of the attestation report. See Attestation for additional details on Keystone’s attestation support.

The Verifier::verify_report method accomplishes 3-5:

Verifier::verify_report(Report& report, const std::string& nonce) {
  debug_verify(report, _sanctum_dev_public_key);

  byte expected_enclave_hash[MDSIZE];

  byte expected_sm_hash[MDSIZE];

      report, expected_enclave_hash, expected_sm_hash, _sanctum_dev_public_key);

  verify_data(report, nonce);

First, let’s dive into how the Enclave hash is computed. It is done by leveraging a simulation mode offered by the Keystone:Enclave class:

Verifier::compute_expected_enclave_hash(byte* expected_enclave_hash) {
  Keystone::Enclave enclave;
  Keystone::Params simulated_params = params_;
  // This will cause validate_and_hash_enclave to be called when
  // isSimulated() == true.
  enclave.init(eapp_file_.c_str(), rt_file_.c_str(), simulated_params);
  memcpy(expected_enclave_hash, enclave.getHash(), MDSIZE);

Secondly, the Security Monitor’s hash is computed using compute_expected_sm_hash:

Verifier::compute_expected_sm_hash(byte* expected_sm_hash) {
  // It is important to make sure the size of the SM buffer we are
  // measuring is the same as the size of the SM buffer allocated by
  // the bootloader. See keystone/bootrom/bootloader.c for how it is
  // computed in the bootloader.
  const size_t sanctum_sm_size = 0x1ff000;
  std::vector<byte> sm_content(sanctum_sm_size, 0);

    // Reading SM content from file.
    FILE* sm_bin = fopen(sm_bin_file_.c_str(), "rb");
    if (!sm_bin)
      throw std::runtime_error(
          "Error opening sm_bin_file_: " + sm_bin_file_ + ", " +
    if (fread(sm_content.data(), 1, sm_content.size(), sm_bin) <= 0)
      throw std::runtime_error(
          "Error reading sm_bin_file_: " + sm_bin_file_ + ", " +

    // The actual SM hash computation.
    hash_ctx_t hash_ctx;
    hash_extend(&hash_ctx, sm_content.data(), sm_content.size());
    hash_finalize(expected_sm_hash, &hash_ctx);

Then, the hashes are compared against the ones in the report:

    Report& report, const byte* expected_enclave_hash,
    const byte* expected_sm_hash, const byte* dev_public_key) {
  if (report.verify(expected_enclave_hash, expected_sm_hash, dev_public_key)) {
    printf("Enclave and SM hashes match with expected.\n");
  } else {
        "Either the enclave hash or the SM hash (or both) does not "
        "match with expeced.\n");

Finally, let’s do 5: Verify the nonce sent from the EApp is the one generated by the verifier:

Verifier::verify_data(Report& report, const std::string& nonce) {
  if (report.getDataSize() != nonce.length() + 1) {
    const char error[] =
        "The size of the data in the report is not equal to the size of the "
        "nonce initially sent.";
    throw std::runtime_error(error);

  if (0 == strcmp(nonce.c_str(), (char*)report.getDataSection())) {
    printf("Returned data in the report match with the nonce sent.\n");
  } else {
    printf("Returned data in the report do NOT match with the nonce sent.\n");

See verifier.h and verifier.cpp for the full implementation of the Verifier class.

7.6.1. Enclave Package

CMakeLists.txt contains packaging commands using makeself. makeself generates a self-extracting archive with a start-up command.

In order to build the example, try the following in the build directory:

make attestor-package

This will generate an enclave package named attestor.ke under <build directory>/examples/attestation. attestor.ke is an self-extracting archive file for the enclave.

Next, copy the package and the Security Monitor binary into the buildroot overlay directory.

# in the build directory
cp examples/attestation/attestor.ke ./overlay/root
cp sm.build/platform/generic/firmware/fw_payload.bin overlay/root/

Running make image in your build directory will generate the buildroot disk image containing the copied package.

# in your <build directory>
make image

7.6.2. Deploying Enclave

Boot the machine with QEMU.


Insert the Keystone driver

# [inside QEMU]
insmod keystone-driver.ko

Deploy the enclave

# [inside QEMU]

You’ll see the enclave running!

Verifying archive integrity... All good.
Uncompressing Keystone Enclave Package
Enclave said value: 5000
Enclave said value: 10000
Attestation report SIGNATURE is valid
Enclave and SM hashes match with expected.
Returned data in the report match with the nonce sent.