2.2. Keystone Basics¶
Keystone is an open framework for architecting trusted execution environments (TEEs) based on hardware enclaves. Keystone aims to provide an easy way of architecting and building a customized TEE for an arbitrary RISC-V platform with a simple workflow. This allows the TEE to be highly optimized for better performance, smaller trusted computing base (TCB), and programmability with a given workload and a threat model.
A Keystone-capable system consists of several components in different privilege modes.
Trusted Hardware is a CPU package built by a trustworthy vendor, and must contain Keystone-compatible standard RISC-V cores and root of trust. The hardware may also contain optional features such as cache partitioning, memory encryption, cryptographically-secure source of randomness, etc. The Security Monitor requires platform specific plug-ins for optional feature support.
Security Monitor (SM) is M-mode software with small TCB. The SM provides an interface for managing the lifecycle of enclave as well as for utilizing platform-specific features. The SM enforces most of Keystone’s security guarantees since it manages the isolation boundary between the enclaves and the untrusted OS.
Enclaves are environments isolated from the untrusted OS and other enclaves. Each enclave is given a private physical memory region which is accessible by only the enclave and SM. Each enclave consists of a user-level enclave application eapp and a supervisor-level runtime.
Enclave Application (eapp) is the user-level application that executes in the enclave. One can build a custom eapp from the scratch, or just run an existing RISC-V executable in Keystone.
Runtime is S-mode software which implements functionality such as system calls, trap handling, virtual memory management and so on.
2.2.2. Keystone Workflow¶
Keystone is a framework wherein both platform provider and enclave developer customize elements of the system to their needs. This involves two separate workflows: one for each of the platform provider and the enclave developer.
220.127.116.11. Provisioning the Security Monitor¶
A platform provider the party who provides a machine which can run Keystone enclaves. In the provisioning stage, the platform provider compiles the security monitor and deploys it to the machine.
The platform provider configures(❶), builds(❷), and then deploys(❸) the security monitor with target hardware.
See Building the Keystone Security Monitor to learn how to build and deploy the security monitor.
18.104.22.168. Developing the Enclave¶
A enclave developer develops an enclave with the Keystone SDK. The developer builds the eapp, the host, and the runtime binaries, and (optionally) packages them together into a single file (❹).
The enclave components are then sent to the remote machine running Keystone and deployed (❺, ❻, and ❼).
See Tutorial 1: Hello, World! to learn how to build an enclave.
22.214.171.124. Remote Attestation¶
Keystone supports basic remote attestation workflows. In these setups the enclave may present proof of its initial state and measurement by the SM to a remote party for validation (❽).
See Tutorial 5: Remote Attestation (Incomplete) to learn how to implement a simple remote attestation flow.
2.2.3. Enclave Lifecycle¶
An enclave starts with a contiguous range of physical memory called enclave private memory (EPM). The untrusted host first allocates the EPM, and initializes it with the enclave’s page table (PT), the runtime (RT), and the eapp. Once the host calls the SM to create an enclave the SM isolates and protects the EPM using a PMP entry. The PMP status is propagated through all cores in the system so that the EPM is protected from any cores. After creation, but before execution, the SM measures and verifies the initial state of the enclave.
The host asks the SM to enter the enclave on one of the cores. The SM releases the PMP permission to the core, and the core starts to execute the enclave. The runtime can exit or re-enter the enclave any time. When a core exits/enters the enclave, it accordingly switches the PMP permissions to keep the isolation.
The host may destroy the enclave at any time.
On destruction, the SM clears the EPM and releases the PMP entry.
The host then finally reclaims the now-free memory.